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1. We Knew Already 
At least, that was what some people said after Ed-
ward Snowden’s leaks on NSA surveillance. Did he tell 
us anything we didn’t know?, asked journalists 
(Milner, 2013). “They didn’t feel much like revela-
tions”, said a director (Laskow, 2013). But what was 
meant by this curious phrase, we knew already? 
“Knew”—yes, some of the information really was 
public knowledge. But even the entirely new aspects 
of it were, apparently, not very surprising. After all, 
the discourse goes, we already “knew” of older NSA 
programs like Trailblazer and ECHELON—so we surely 
expected something like PRISM. But who is this “we”? 
The discourse designates a depersonalised hivemind: 
the knowledge of NSA surveillance was stored in our 
collective archive, though the proof is in nonhuman 
documents rather than what individuals can “remem-
ber”. Sometimes, the “we” instead designates the 
journalist, the director, the activist: the “we” in the 
know who pens these commentaries, the “we” that is 
less gullible than the average Joe, the “we” of the “we 
told you so”. And what about the “already”? Despite 
itself, the discourse is less about defining past con-
cerns and more about characterising the present. It is 
a way to designate a historicity for the revelations—
whether to dampen the outrage or stoke it. So: this 
we sure isn’t everyone, and sometimes excludes me  
at least; and the knowing it did certainly wasn’t a very 
comprehensive one. Satire, as it so often does, brings 
these ambiguities into the open: “We already knew 
the NSA spies on us. We already know everything. 
Everything is boring” (“We already knew,” 2015). 
What has knowing ever done for us, anyway?  
These questions provoke and organise the present 
essay. I argue that what happened with Snowden was 
not a simple flip of the switch from collective igno-
rance to enlightenment. Rather, it is a question of 
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what knowing involves. How do we develop belief 
about a surveillance system so vast it cannot be expe-
rienced by any single individual—and moreover, a 
surveillance system which consistently seeks to re-
cede from lived experience? How is a “we”-that-
knows interpellated, and how is this “knowledge” lev-
eraged to authorise actions and opinions? It is often 
said that surveillance inherently violates our funda-
mental rights, and the public need only be informed 
in order to rise up against it. Others explain contem-
porary surveillance in terms of disempowerment, 
paranoia and anxiety (Andrejevic, 2013a; Bauman & 
Lyon, 2013; Browne, 2010). Yet for all the merits of 
such criticism, they sit uneasily with the fact that 
most people have learned to live with their awareness 
of Orwellian surveillance. Whether one seeks to de-
fend state surveillance or denounce it, the basic op-
eration that underlies both is a “world-building”. The 
facts and arguments are cobbled together to present 
a new intuition, a new common sense, about how this 
enormous technological apparatus runs our world. 
Hence the question: how do we develop a sense of 
contemporary surveillance as a world “out there”?  
In what follows, I first describe the recession of sur-
veillance practices from the subject’s lived experience. 
The gap created by this recession accentuates the role 
of speculation and belief. I then offer a conceptualisa-
tion of world-building vis-à-vis surveillance, drawing 
especially from phenomenology, affect theory and rit-
ual theory. Finally, I discuss two common patterns in 
the Snowden affair discourse to indicate particular 
techniques of world-building. They are (1) subjunctivi-
ty, the conceit of I cannot “know” but I must act “as if”; 
(2) interpassivity, which says I don’t believe it/I am not 
affected, but someone else is (in my stead). These latter 
sections are based on ongoing research into the public 
discourse on the Snowden affair for a larger project. 
This essay draws on U.S. media coverage from June 6, 
2013 (the date of the first leak) until March 14, 2014, 
focusing on prominent publications such as The New 
York Times and The Washington Post.1 It also draws on 
high-profile public statements, such as Edward Snow-
den’s public appearances and statements by President 
Obama or NSA personnel. The essay’s arguments arise 
from identification of the recession of surveillance, and 
techniques for coping with that recession, in this body 
of discourse.  
                                                          
1 All relevant coverage from the following publications were 
examined: New Yorker, The Atlantic, The Intercept, The New 
York Times, The Washington Post, Wired (all online). The 
Guardian was also included as an especially relevant publica-
tion that was also read directly by many U.S. readers (which 
was not necessarily being true of Der Spiegel, another key 
player in the affair). Some snowballing was also conducted on 
the data for this essay. 
2. Recession 
People should be able to pick up the phone and 
call their family, should be able to send a text 
message to their loved ones, buy a book online, 
without worrying how this could look to a gov-
ernment possibly years in the future. (Edward 
Snowden in Rowan, 2014) 
The irony is that many of us—including those outraged 
by NSA surveillance—do call our family, buy books 
online, and sleep very well at night. A few months after 
Snowden’s appearance, a Pew survey (Rainie, Kiesler, 
Kang, & Madden, 2013) suggested that the majority of 
Americans believe their privacy is not well protected by 
current laws. Yet in most cases, their response 
amounted to deleting cookies. If the gesture was hope-
lessly inadequate, it at least had the virtue of being 
convenient. This apparent contradiction arises from 
the recession of surveillance. In contrast to the flood of 
media reports, actual surveillance technologies sys-
tematically withdraw from our lived experience and 
“personal” knowability. The mantra for this situation: “I 
know they might be watching, Edward Snowden told 
me so—but I don’t ‘experience’ it.”   
We can first of all characterise this recession as 
technological. In a basic sense, all technology involves a 
withdrawal from sensory experience. Heidegger’s ham-
mer externalises human action and intention, and em-
beds it in a crafted object (Scarry, 1985). Computational 
technology often amplifies this recessive character. The 
smooth surface of the smartphone, even compared to 
the gears and chains on a bicycle, encourages us to for-
get the connections, dependencies and processes that 
maintain our environment—and should we remember, 
denies us easy access to that knowledge (Berry, 2011, 
Chapter 5). This is precisely the case with contemporary 
online surveillance. It is designed to operate behind the 
front-end user interface, sweeping up personal data out 
of human awareness. It interacts with the world—and 
us—in ways that our senses cannot access.2 Even the 
physical databanks are literally isolated in a giant data 
centre in the Utah countryside. This is in distinct contrast 
to, say, American police surveillance. In that case, the 
post-1970’s period has seen techniques like house raids, 
court summons, patrols, pat-downs and urine tests to 
impose state power viscerally upon the (especially poor 
black) population (Goffman, 2014). If in police raids or 
airport screenings (Adey, 2009; Parks, 2007; Schouten, 
2014) surveillance intrudes rudely upon one’s space, 
habit, affect and body programs like PRISM do the oppo-
                                                          
2 In Mark Hansen’s (and through him, Whitehead’s) vocabu-
lary, recession is a question of phenomenological access. Sur-
veillance is not only hidden in a traditional sense (classified, 
made a state secret); the technology itself is designed to oper-
ate at a sub-experiential level. See Hansen, 2015.  
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site. They evacuate every sign of their existence from 
lived experience. Consider the web beacon, commonly 
used in corporate/commercial surveillance. Also called 
tracking pixels, it is a tiny (1 × 1 single pixel), transparent 
object embedded into web pages to track user access. It 
is literally invisible to the naked eye, and the user may 
only discover it by bringing up the source code. Of 
course, even if I am informed of the existence of bea-
cons and how they work, I quickly realise that it is im-
practical to comb through the source code of every page 
I visit. Momentarily armed with the power of 
knowledge, I surrender it again in favour of a deferred 
and simulated feeling-knowing: “I would be able to tell if 
a beacon is tracking me if I took the time to look.”  
The beacon illustrates the recession’s epistemologi-
cal properties. The subject is distanced from 
knowledge of surveillance at multiple levels. There is 
what we might call, in Rumsfeldian terms (Hannah, 
2010), a “known unknown”: I know that I will never 
know if an NSA agent has gone through my metadata. 
Then, there is the “unknown unknown”: Snowden has 
revealed programs like PRISM and XKeyscore, but given 
the apparently enormous quantities of documents in 
Snowden’s hands, and given that Snowden himself 
won’t know everything, I now know that I am unlikely 
to ever know what I don’t know about my vulnerability 
to surveillance. In Kafka’s The Trial, what strikes Josef 
K. is not the fact that he is charged with serious crimes; 
it is that, despite every desperate attempt, the inscru-
table bureaucracy yields no knowledge of what he is 
charged with and why. Certainly, Snowden’s revela-
tions have provided new information about state sur-
veillance; “we” can say we “know” more than we had 
before. But we can see that this knowing can actually 
contribute to the recession of surveillance.  
One ironic aspect of this recession is that most of us 
experience discourse about surveillance more than sur-
veillance itself—a situation we also find with respect to 
globalisation (Cheah, 2008) and the nation-state (Ander-
son, 1991). Surveillance becomes available for talk and 
thought precisely as an estranged and phantasmal ob-
ject. Through public, mediated discourse surrounding 
the Snowden affair, we make this surveillance into 
something knowable and sensible—even if the kinds of 
beliefs produced here are not strictly reducible to objec-
tive fact. This is what I mean by world-building activity. It 
is the interpellation of the surveillance society as a world 
“out there”. Recession and world-building are inter-
twined. The former emphasises what we do not and 
cannot “know” for ourselves. The latter is how, despite 
this gap, we try to make some sense of the world we 
find ourselves in. Surveillance hides from us, but we 
cannot help but talk about it endlessly.  
3. The “Out There” 
Our ability to render surveillance society comprehensi-
ble is predicated not (only) on objective proof and 
available facts, but conventionalised ways for putting 
what we know together with what we don’t know; 
ways for forming a coherent, though often incon-
sistent, picture. As noted above, many Americans—
through media like Pew surveys—claim they are con-
cerned about surveillance and often feel unsafe. At the 
same time, this same public has exhibited a clear will-
ingness to live in and with this surveillance society, in 
many (not all) cases declining to take revolutionary or 
directly political action in response to the Snowden 
leaks. It is not sufficient to presume false conscious-
ness, an illusory daze maintained by a clever concoc-
tion of ideology, misinformation and obfuscation. Stud-
ies into risk perception have shown that becoming 
better informed does not necessarily correlate to a 
stronger perception of dangers—or concrete actions 
taken to mitigate them (Douglas, 1992; Wildavsky & 
Dake, 1990, pp. 31-32). A similar sentiment is now be-
ing expressed by surveillance and privacy scholars. Sub-
jects can know very well their rights are being violated 
and live with that violation (Andrejevic, 2013b; Man-
sell, 2012; Turow, 2013). The key is not to seek to un-
ravel this “contradiction” into a consistent explanation, 
one which would supply us with a “worldview” with a 
singular internal logic. Subjects, Lauren Berlant tells us, 
are surprisingly good at managing their affective inco-
herence and disorganisation, and defending it in their 
own terms (Berlant & Edelman, 2014, p. 6; Berlant & 
Greenwald, 2012). When my firm belief in control over 
my life is challenged by news of state surveillance, or 
when my habituated attachment to new media bristles 
against my political views, I do not always respond with 
bold and sweeping changes to smooth out the differ-
ences. Rational consistency is often not our highest 
priority. Instead, what emerges is a set of platitudes, 
“common sense” wisdoms, habits, turns of phrase, 
speculative beliefs, recited facts, which support pre-
cisely the contradictions I have already come to em-
body. Now, this line of thought must be distinguished 
from older modernist denigrations of “primitive” be-
liefs. Those were presumed to be an amalgamation of 
non-scientific mistakes taken as eternal truths—thus 
explaining their resistance to rationalist “demystifica-
tion”. Here, it is a question of making knowledge of the 
world work for what subjects can’t help but know, face, 
and deal with in their present lives. In short, to study 
world-building activity vis-à-vis surveillance is to under-
stand how we cope (Berlant, 2011) with our own per-
sistent living while under exposure to a relentless pro-
gram of observation. 
This isn’t to say that nothing can knock us off from 
our serene perch. Crises happen—sometimes erupting 
in political and psychological drama, sometimes undo-
ing social cohesion or individual well-being quietly in 
the backstage. Surveillance, too, can sometimes con-
front subjects violently and threateningly. The world-
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building perspective is to explain how things “work”—
not perfectly, but sufficiently—in those times when cri-
ses don’t happen, or when (possible) crises become 
dampened into compromises and apologies. The 
Snowden leaks certainly did challenge our previously 
built worlds. For some, it really was a crisis, driving 
them to explicit changes in behaviour. But many sub-
jects also found ways to restore normalcy precisely by 
responding to new narratives and events, and rebuild-
ing their positionality vis-à-vis the world out there. 
That is what we have always done, after all—even back 
when “we knew already”. A great deal of knowledge 
about U.S. state surveillance had been available to the 
public before 2013. But this “we” had stumbled on 
ways to keep that knowledge sequestered in a dusty 
corner, a largely negligible and rather conspiratorial 
fact about “politics these days”.  
What these world-building responses suggest is 
that we have multiple ways of “knowing” and “believ-
ing”. Indeed, those very terms do not do justice to that 
multiplicity. What does it mean to “know” when a 
teenager says “I know what I learned in school today”, 
but can’t articulate it to the expectant parent? What 
does it mean to “believe” in God but nevertheless de-
mand scientific proof of his existence—or, inversely, 
accomplish my “belief” by submitting to Pascal’s wa-
ger? As Žižek might quip, we know many “truths”, but 
truths we are willing to die for, which we believe in ab-
solutely in any circumstance, are all too rare. This is 
easier for us to grasp when we consider a nonmodern 
case. The Dorzé people in Ethiopia believe leopards are 
also Coptic Christian and observe fasting days pre-
scribed by the religion…and on those fasting days, they 
will take care to protect their livestock from hungry 
leopards, as they’ve always done (Veyne, 1998, pp. xi-
xii). They see nothing strange in this. Similar cases 
abound in anthropological writings. The Nuer believe 
twins are birds, which is distinct from saying birds are 
twins or that this twin is a bird (Douglas, 2001, p. 148). 
The key is to take on such contradictions not as mis-
takes or ignorance but as genuine world-building tech-
niques. Or again: Merleau-Ponty (2012) argues that 
mythology or madness is not a case where our objec-
tive connectivity with the material world is underde-
veloped or broken. Rather, a mythological explanation 
or a schizophrenic’s hallucinations, for those subjects, 
involve a way of perceiving and understanding the 
world that is just as intuitive and genuine as our rela-
tionship to science, visual phenomena or speech. A 
schizophrenic woman believes two people with similar 
looking faces must know each other (Merleau-Ponty, 
2012, pp. 298-299). This is an abnormal wiring of 
world-building capacity, but one which makes life pos-
sible and sensible for this woman in the same way some-
thing like physiognomy did normatively for 19th century 
urban dwellers (Pearl, 2010). The normal is full of arbi-
trary connections, too; one example is confabulation, or 
the pre-reflective and non-deliberate fabrication of per-
sonal memory that appears to occur in spontaneous 
ways to achieve self-understanding of what just hap-
pened (Orulv & Hyden, 2006).  
In short, not only are our worldviews often complex 
and contradictory, we are also able to hold a plurality 
of relationships to the world out there through these 
flexible ways of knowing and believing. Why do we do 
this? Because contradiction and even incoherence can 
often be of great use in our ordinary living. Sometimes 
it’s a matter of convenience, or of persuading others 
(and myself), of saving face. Sometimes we persist in 
some kind of belief because to jettison it would change 
our own image of ourselves unacceptably. The “effect” 
of a truth or belief is thus entangled with its “cause”. To 
accuse such activity of inauthenticity is to miss the point. 
Such multiplicity is often critical to our ability to cope 
with our lived reality. It is what gives the subject the 
power to stay cohesive across the battery of situations 
and challenges it faces each day and hour—to maintain 
a feeling that despite everything, the world continues to 
make some minimal sense.  
The next two sections will discuss concrete ways in 
which such world-building is taking place in the wake 
of the Snowden affair. They analyse how public debate 
is producing various narratives of the new surveillance 
world, and importantly, what specific ways of knowing 
and believing are involved in such production. The 
mass media plays what we might call a ritualistic role in 
this process. Media has been classified as ritualistic in 
the sense that media activity itself is often calendrical 
and collectively coordinated for effects of “liveness” 
and participation (Dayan & Katz, 1992). This effect is 
not reducible to the symbolic content of media cover-
age. Even if not everyone watches the same television 
program, even if interpretations of specific messages 
differ, even if some may not take media reports of the 
dangers of surveillance seriously, mass media have a 
phatic effect. The rhythmic pattern with which they 
take a place in our everyday life produces in itself a 
sense of connectivity to a wider world (Frosh, 2011). 
This phenomenological relationship enjoins the public 
not to swallow whatever they are told by the television 
anchor, but to continually adjust their position—
sceptical, believing, critical, supportive—relative to me-
dia representations (Carey, 1975). It is on this basis that 
media performs itself as a “centre” of society, one which 
provides “transcendent patterns within which the details 
of social life make sense” (Couldry, 2003, p. 3). In other 
words, the media is less an indisputable source of factual 
statements about the world, than it is a repository of 
themes, topics and interests against which we form our 
beliefs about how the world works. One might decry 
surveillance coverage in the media as conspiratorial 
nonsense (of the Left, of the Right, of the American gov-
ernment, or the Russian one…) and disbelieve it; but 
that very move often entails trusting that coverage as 
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some reflection of what “people out there” believe.  
This leads back to the “we” of “we knew already”. 
Insofar as my sense of the surveillance world is framed 
in relation to what I believe is the public understanding 
and experience of surveillance, the public “out there” 
becomes an essential part of this mediated world-
building. Indeed, the modern public, from its very in-
ception in the age of the printing press, has always had 
a virtual and imagined quality. After all, what I can see 
and hear on my own is always only a small part of that 
human multitude, one which extends into the “out 
there” as an indefinite set of strangers (Eisenstein, 
1980; Tarde, 1969; Warner, 2002). We learn to author-
ise ourselves to speak on the public’s behalf, or at 
least, presume what the public thinks and knows, in 
order to produce our own positions (Bourdieu, 1979; 
Hong, 2014). Media discourse, insofar as it is a ritual-
ised promise of a “centre” of society, instructs its audi-
ence not only on what the public allegedly is, but how 
to relate to the public as an object of knowledge and 
belief (Fraser, 2006, pp. 155-156). Media discourse is 
thus the site where multiple ways of knowing and be-
lieving are expressed and legitimated, and it is on this 
basis that we are able to build a sense of surveillance 
as the world “out there”. We now move to two specific 
patterns: subjunctivity and interpassivity.  
4. Subjunctivity 
Your rights matter because you never know 
when you’re going to need them. People should 
be able to pick up the phone and call their family, 
should be able to send a text message to their 
loved one, buy a book online, without worrying 
how this could look to a government possibly 
years in the future. (Snowden in Rowan, 2014) 
I buy fire insurance ever since I retired, the wife 
and I bought a house out here and we buy fire 
insurance every year. Never had a fire. But I am 
not gonna quit buying my fire insurance, same 
kind of thing. (James Clapper in Lake, 2014) 
“You never know” is the ominous mantra that grounds 
both the claims of Edward Snowden, whistleblower, 
and of James Clapper, the U.S. Director of National In-
telligence. “You never know” invokes a looming: a 
threat that is nothing yet, but is very much real in its 
existence as potential (Massumi, 2005, p. 35). The Or-
wellian future where you might be punished for your 
ordinary actions today; the apocalyptic scenario when 
terrorism happens to you and your family. That which 
by definition cannot ever be made certain is invoked as 
presumptively real in order to legitimise action—
whether for or against state surveillance.  
This is the as-if, the subjunctive. Grammatically, the 
subjunctive mood is the flotation of a non-true state-
ment: “if I were…” This very construction produces an 
ambiguity, a split construction of “belief”. Such con-
structions sustain a state of affairs which is neither 
mere illusion nor fully believed to be true. In the 
Snowden discourse, we find the paradigmatic formula-
tion of subjunctivity to be the as if: we must act, think, 
feel, believe, as if I am personally under watch, as if 
terrorism is about to happen to me, as if surveillance 
does help us prevent terrorism. In other words, the 
subjunctive involves a two-pronged handling of 
knowledge and belief, and this very ambiguity is what 
lets us leverage the unknown: “Yes, we don’t know if 
it’s true or not, but we have to pretend it is true”. It is 
telling that one of the few scholarly fields where sub-
junctivity is commonly discussed is in science fiction 
studies, centred on the work of Samuel R. Delany 
(1971). Although deployments of subjunctivity do not 
materially count as “events”, these characteristics 
mark them as highly ritualistic. Rituals have been called 
“time out of time” (Rappaport, 1999, pp. 216-222). 
They are moments when we collectively say, wait: let 
us step out of our rules and rhythms of life for a mo-
ment, so that they may be renewed and reaffirmed, or 
even, adjusted with localised change (such as the 
change in status of an individual member in a rite of 
passage). Similarly, the as-if is a way to step into a limi-
nal (Turner, 1982) zone in one’s thinking and believing, 
but one which is then sutured back into one’s assess-
ment of “reality”. It is a way for us to deal with our ig-
norance, our uncertainty, and other ways in which our 
present and ourselves in that present disappoint us. It 
is a way to cope with the imperfections and vulnerabili-
ties of our exposure to power and danger.  
This subjunctive turn in surveillance has been sub-
ject to much commentary. In risk literature, it is de-
scribed in terms of “precautionary” or “catastrophic” 
risk—enormous uncertainties of climate change and 
terrorism which outstrip the industrial risks of factory 
disasters and chemical contaminations (Aradau & van 
Munster, 2007; Ewald, 1993). Surveillance studies fre-
quently references Brian Massumi’s (2007) pre-emptive 
logic: a radicalisation of traditional causality and proof in 
a world of pure potentiality. My account does not neces-
sarily supplant or contradict these theorisations. Rather, 
it emphasises the world-making aspects of subjunctive 
logic; a world-making which is capable of supporting 
both pro- and anti-surveillance attitudes.  
The first type of as-if that permeates our present 
relationship to surveillance is the uncertainty about 
whether I am being watched at all. This effect is creat-
ed by the juxtaposition of an apparently enormous and 
pervasive surveillance system, and, given its recession, 
the fact that the surveilled subject will rarely know if 
they have ever been “watched” by a human agent. 
Surveillance becomes a Deleuzian virtual. For Snowden 
and other opponents of NSA surveillance, it is critical to 
overcome this felt recession if the public is to “build” a 
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world where surveillance is a keen danger. Ironically, this 
task is undertaken by combating another kind of as-if. 
Anti-NSA discourse consistently interpellate an imagined 
public, one which presumably thinks it is safe as long as 
it has not done anything “wrong”. A New York Times op-
doc, “Why Care About the N.S.A.?” opens thus:  
Narrator: I want to get your response to a few 
things people typically say who aren’t concerned 
about recent surveillance revelations. 
David Sirota: Nobody is looking at my stuff anyway, 
so I don’t care? My argument for that is if you don’t 
speak up for everybody’s rights, you better be 
ready for your own rights to be trampled when you 
least expect it. First and foremost, there are so 
many laws on the books, there are so many stat-
utes out there, that you actually probably are doing 
something wrong….So when you start saying I’m 
not doing anything wrong…you better be really sure 
of that. (Knappenberger, 2013) 
Sirota’s warning is accompanied by a dizzying array of 
legalese in flight (Figure 1). By shifting the subject’s 
gaze onto the bureaucratic and technological depths 
which almost entirely lie beyond everyday experience, 
the subject is divested of the ability to confirm or deny 
his/her own safety. This is distinct from the simple 
claim that we are not safe. It is (also) the claim that we 
do not have the ability or resources to tell in the first 
place. The projected “common sensical” subject is ap-
pealed to through an indeterminate “what if” situation, 
and implicitly, the argument is made that since the 
“what if” is particularly unsavoury, it should be consid-
ered as an “as if”. Thus the reality of surveillance is im-
pressed upon the subject not by recovering concrete 
surveillance practices from their recession, but actually 
by expanding their virtual dimension into an enormous, 
totalitarian as-if. Snowden and his sympathisers argue 
they are informing the public. True. But what they are 
also doing, above and beyond that, is to modulate an 
imagination which is necessarily in excess of the infor-
mation strictly available. 
This same technique is applied to the objective of 
surveillance itself: the threat of crime, and especially of 
terrorism. James Clapper quips that PRISM is no differ-
ent from fire insurance. But insurance developed its 
appeal by quantifying fearful indeterminacy into per-
centages and premiums. The strategic use of disaster 
statistics and risk percentages could claim to provide a 
stable and objectively factual knowledge of danger and 
vulnerability. This is decidedly not the case with post-
9/11 surveillance (Beck, 2009; Ewald, 1993). Terrorist 
attacks are sometimes analysed statistically, but their 
relative scarcity makes it difficult to draw convincing 
conclusions. The danger of being surveilled or falling 
victim to a terrorist attack is generally not parsed in 
terms of estimable “risks” (at least, not in public de-
bate). As has been extensively analysed (and criticised), 
U.S. surveillance and anti-terror policy following Sep-
tember 11 has been predicated on the idea that even 
one attack is too much, and even one percentage a 
chance is too great (Aradau & van Munster, 2007; 
Cooper, 2006; Hannah, 2010). The proponents of state 
surveillance thus rely on the same “excessive” designa-
tion of the as-if. One key metaphor for NSA surveillance 
programs has been the dragnet, traditionally used to de-
scribe police activities like location-wide stop and frisks. 
The dragnet indiscriminately collects data on the inno-
cent as well as the suspicious, highly relevant data as 
well as irrelevant ones—because the innocent can al-
ways turn out to be the criminal, and the most irrele-
vant piece of data may help triangulate his/her identity.  
 
Figure 1. “Why care about the NSA?” 
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Within this rationality, surveillance is not, strictly speak-
ing, proven to be necessary by past terror attacks or 
present identification of concrete dangers. Proof is al-
ways deferred: we must act as if the efficacy of this 
program has been proven by a danger which, if we are 
right, we will prevent from ever actualising. 
Subjunctivity is one name for how public figures 
present the world of surveillance. Importantly, this 
presentation is also a part of public subjects’ wider, 
lived relationship to that complicated and distant 
world. And crucially, our relationship to the media dis-
course on surveillance itself becomes subjunctive as we 
try to navigate this tangle of complex and often con-
tradictory claims. How can we produce a picture that 
makes sufficient sense to us, and how can we say to 
ourselves that we “know enough” to act, to not act, or 
at least to have an opinion about the whole affair? For 
instance, the subject’s ability to assess the legality of 
surveillance becomes challenged by his/her experience 
of this discourse. Snowden’s revelations were, at least, 
generally accepted in the media as solid, reliable in-
formation about the technical process of NSA surveil-
lance. However, the precise legality of each given prac-
tice, and indeed, the question of who actually knows 
about and guarantees each practice, is explicitly des-
ignated as uncertain. As one headline put it: “You’ll 
Never Know if the NSA Is Breaking the Law” (Bump, 
2013). On one level, as David Sirota did above, it is 
suggested that there are so many different programs, 
legal decisions, secret courts and procedures in-
volved, the public as a whole will “always” be left un-
certain as to if the letter of the law is really being bro-
ken. On another level, we cannot presume that the 
reading public is a homogeneous mind with full access 
to every piece of information made available to them. 
The “we” of “we knew already” does not exist in such 
a form. Most subjects are likely to experience a par-
tial picture, based on their limited reading and recall, 
of conflicting arguments and claims made in public. 
One may not keep up with every Snowden leak, tell 
apart XKeyscore from PRISM, or even understand ex-
actly what counts as metadata and what doesn’t. But 
it is more than possible to take away a general pic-
ture: the idea that the legality of surveillance is uncer-
tain, and that any opinion or action we take will have 
to happen in abeyance of that knowledge.  
What these situations suggest is that information 
often begets uncertainty, and in turn, provokes sub-
junctive responsivities. It is indisputable that Snow-
den’s leaks have increased the total amount of 
knowledge we collectively hold about NSA surveil-
lance. But the more Snowden reveals, the more cause 
we have for paranoia and uncertainty—an ironic re-
versal of Shannon’s law of information. When we 
learn that the NSA monitors video game chatter for 
terrorist activity (Ball, 2013), it does not provide reas-
surance that we now know everything there is to 
know about that sordid affair. Rather, it gives us li-
cense to believe that if such a thing is true, surely 
many more things might be as well. Table 1 lists only 
the major additions to “our” knowledge of NSA sur-
veillance between June 2013 and March 2014. It is 
quantitatively beyond what most subjects can afford 
to give full attention to. Indeed, the sheer number of 
documents Snowden has been said to possess—1.7 
million by one count (Kelley, 2013)—makes the 
Snowden files themselves an inexhaustible and virtual 
repository of new revelations, just like the NSA’s port-
folio of surveillance technologies or the manifold 
dangers of the post-9/11 world. As with the question 
of legality, many subjects proceed with a general 
awareness that there is a plethora of leaks, without a 
firm grip on each leak or what they concretely add up 
to. Mary Douglas once asked: why do experts insist on 
educating the public about issues like climate change? 
Don’t they realise that the more information becomes 
available, the more possible interpretations arise, and 
the more intractable a sensitive topic becomes? 
(2001, p. 146) To this, we might add: don’t they know 
that information can feed speculation, rather than ex-
tinguish it? The Snowden leaks have provided addi-
tional ingredients for feeling uncertain and vulnera-
ble. Whatever political position (including apathy and 
a “wait-and-see” prudence) one chooses, whatever 
imagination of surveillance one subscribes to, it must 
be predicated on an uncertain and receded reality 
that one chooses to overcome through the “as-if”. 
Finally, the subjunctive experience even extends to 
cases where subjects do try and take concrete steps to 
protect themselves from surveillance. While Edward 
Snowden espouses the benefits of programs like TOR, 
he admits: 
You will still be vulnerable to targeted surveillance. 
If there is a warrant against you if the NSA is after 
you they are still going to get you. But mass surveil-
lance that is untargeted and collect-it-all approach 
you will be much safer [with these basic steps]. 
(“Edward Snowden SXSW,” 2014) 
Nearly every privacy solution recommended today 
comes with such caveats. As the concerned public 
flocked to existing privacy solutions, one VPN (Virtual 
Private Network) developer—a common alternative to 
TOR—commented:  
If you’re concerned about surveillance agencies 
such as the NSA, their capabilities are shrouded in 
secrecy and claiming to be able to protect you is 
offering you nothing but speculation. (Renkema, 
2014) 
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Table 1. Major revelations on NSA surveillance, June 2013―March 2014. 
14.3.12 Leak: NSA “Expert System” for malware implants allegedly planned 
14.2.10 Leak: NSA metadata & geolocation helps drone attack 
14.1.27 Leak: NSA uses “leaky” mobile apps 
14.1.16 Leak: NSA collects millions of texts 
13.12.13 Leak: NSA cracks cell phone encryption for A5/1 (2G standard) 
13.12.10 Leak: NSA uses cookies to spy 
13.12.9 Leak: NSA uses video games to spy 
13.12.4 Leak: NSA collects 5 billion phone records per day 
13.11.26 Leak: NSA spies on porn habits 
13.11.23 Leak: NSA “Computer Network Exploitation” infects 50k networks 
13.11.14 Leak: CIA collects bulk international money transfers 
13.10.31 Leak: NSA hid spy equipment at embassies & consulates 
13.10.30 Leak: NSA attacks Google & Yahoo data centres 
13.10.24 Leak: NSA tapped 35 world leader calls 
13.10.21 Leak: NSA spied on Mexico’s Calderon, emails 
13.10.14 Leak: NSA collects US address books, buddy lists 
13.10.4 Leak: NSA can hack Tor 
13.10.2 Leak: NSA stores cell phone locations up to 2 years 
13.9.30 Leak: NSA stores metadata up to a year 
13.9.28 Leak: NSA maps Americans” social contacts 
13.9.16 Leak: NSA “Follow the Money” division tracks credit card transactions 
13.9.7 Leak: NSA can tap into smartphone data 
13.9.5 Leak: NSA attacks encryption standards and hacks 
13.8.29 Leak: US intelligence “black budget” 
13.8.23 Leak: NSA employees spy on ex-lovers 
13.8.15 Leak: NSA internal audit shows thousands of violations 
13.7.11 Leak: XKEYSCORE program. 
13.7.10 Leak: NSA “Upstream” fibreoptic spying capacities 
13.6.30 Additional PRISM leaks 
13.6.19 Leak: NSA “Project Chess” for Skype  
13.6.17 Apple, Microsoft, Facebook release details 
13.6.16 Leak: NSA spied on Medvedev at G20, 2009 
13.6.11 Leak: BOUNDLESS INFORMANT for surveillance records globally 
13.6.10 Snowden named 
13.6.9 Leak: NSA record/analysis tool 
13.6.7 Leak: “Presidential Policy Directive 20” for cyberattacks to foreign targets 
13.6.6 Leak: PRISM revealed 
 
In other words, the subject’s feeling safe enough is 
predicated on his/her ability to live on  as if whatever 
tools chosen (including none) has provided sufficient 
protection against this unknown and silent risk. After 
all, one will never know if one’s privacy was in fact 
compromised. The lived experience of interacting 
with privacy tools also contributes to this subjunctive 
situation. Consider AVG PrivacyFix (Figure 2), one of 
many simpler tools which promise to protect against 
(in this case, corporate) surveillance. It is all too easy: 
a few clicks, yellow and white symbols flashing into a 
reassuring green, and one is allegedly safer. Certainly, 
some of this software at least does provide some real 
mitigation against major surveillance techniques. But 
for any subject that is not particularly well informed 
or technologically savvy, the experience of using 
these programs is often a simulation of safety: a simu-
lation against the inscrutable backdrop of a receded 
world. And so, even the subject who does “everything 
possible” to guard against surveillance must subjunc-
tively reassure him/herself that “everything possible 
has probably been done”. 
The as-if is a technique for leveraging the receded, 
virtual enormity of “surveillance” to a produce a pre-
sumptive basis for knowing and believing. Such 
knowledge or belief is ambiguous and complex. One 
acknowledges the probabilistic or speculative nature 
of one’s own belief, but simultaneously applies a 
practical—and sometimes even moral—injunction 
that hardens this belief and qualifies it for speech and 
action. 
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Figure 2. AVG PrivacyFix user interface. 
5. Interpassivity  
Interpassivity originally arose from art and media theory 
as a response to the dominion of “interactivity” (Pfaller, 
2003; Scholzel, 2014; Van Oenen, 2002). It is now appli-
cable as a more general conceit: “not me, but another 
for me”. Someone else believes, so that even if I do not, 
it remains a kind of “truth” (Žižek, n.d.). I Xerox a book or 
VCR a television show, and become satisfied that I have 
nearly consumed it; in a way, the machine has “watched 
it for me” (Pfaller, 2003). This deferral, this “outsourc-
ing” (Van Oenen, 2002), has numerous practical uses. In-
terpassivity allows us to maintain beliefs which may not 
be supported by our own behaviour, identity and envi-
ronment. I don’t believe Obama is Muslim, but there are 
people who do. I don’t find this content morally offen-
sive, but other people might. In such cases, the inter-
passive articulation excuses the subject from being 
bound to the belief in question, even as that belief is hy-
postatised into reality, thereby forming a reliable basis 
for opinions and actions. Indeed, in some cases, “dele-
gating one’s beliefs makes them stronger than before” 
(Pfaller, 2001, p. 37): my beliefs now appear as objective 
fact, something I cannot dismiss as mere flight of my 
fancy. We are familiar with this mechanism, of course, in 
the work of rumour. The conceit “I have heard it said 
elsewhere” holds the truthfulness of the rumour in con-
stant suspense, adding to its resilience. I cannot van-
quish a speaker who is there in absentia.  
It is critical to understand what kind of “belief” is at 
stake in an interpassive movement. When I “act as if 
the Xerox machine were reading the text [for me]” 
(Pfaller, 2003), clearly, I do not “literally” believe that I 
have read the book. But I may well derive satisfaction 
from the act; a satisfaction that says “it is almost as if I 
have read the book, since I can now read it at any time 
I choose.” When canned laughter laughs “for me” in a 
television sitcom, I do not look back and say “I now 
need not laugh.” But, as Žižek (n.d.) points out, the ex-
perience can often leave me feeling “relieved” and 
rested afterwards. Such satisfaction is not necessarily 
reducible to false consciousness or pathological mis-
recognition. Interpassive techniques are ways for sub-
jects to navigate a world which is so often alien to them, 
a world which they must nevertheless and constantly ar-
ticulate as sensible and reliable. We employ interpassivi-
ty on a daily basis because it is a way to cobble together 
some understanding of politics, technology, public opin-
ion, in the face of the harsh fact that so much of it ex-
ceeds our own experience and environment. The very 
ability to believe in surveillance as a part of our world is 
predicated on some noncongruence, some difference, 
between my “here” and the “out there”.  
Interpassivity was commonly leveraged in the 
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Snowden affair to mitigate precisely the recession of 
surveillance practices and knowledge from public de-
bate. Indeed, certain “knowns” were quite explicitly 
evacuated out of the public domain and designated as 
“known elsewhere”: 
Here’s the rub: the instances where [NSA surveil-
lance] has produced good—has disrupted plots, 
prevented terrorist attacks, is all classified, that’s 
what’s so hard about this. (Dianne Feinstein in 
Knowlton, 2013) 
Feinstein and others insisted that the fruits of surveil-
lance could not be proven publicly, lest that too en-
danger national security. Although one or two concrete 
cases have been mentioned (such as Najibullah Zazi’s 
2009 plot), the general trend was to claim that proof, 
too, was classified for the sake of security. Notably, 
these claims do not simply place the public in igno-
rance of “all the facts”; they demand that public delib-
eration take place in full awareness of that ignorance. 
It becomes impossible to simply say “the benefits of 
surveillance have not been proven”, since proof has 
been publicly designated as existing elsewhere. Fein-
stein’s apology asks the reading public to actively hold 
their judgment in abeyance, or to be precise, make 
their judgment by simulating what someone else 
knows in their stead. All this is compounded by admis-
sions that even the special court tasked to know in our 
stead—a court that is itself secret—also judges in igno-
rance. Reggie Walton, the presiding judge of that very 
court at the time, explains: 
The FISC [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court] is 
forced to rely upon the accuracy of the information 
that is provided to the Court…the FISC does not have 
the capacity to investigate issues of noncompliance, 
and in that respect the FISC is in the same position as 
any other court when it comes to enforcing [gov-
ernment] compliance with its orders. (Leonnig, 2013) 
The public is thus deprived of even the comforting 
thought that the law or the government “knows” in its 
stead. Rather, it is an indistinct other, dispersed and 
elusive, which promises to guarantee that surveillance 
indeed has been proven. This makes the interpassive 
movement fragile and speculative. When expert 
knowledge is stably instituted, the public can feel that 
it may reliably defer the work of knowing to those ex-
perts, and build a sensible world out of what the public 
itself does not know (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990). 
When expertise itself is threatened, as in climate 
change or the Snowden affair, the subject must make 
sense of what is happening in a more speculative and, 
indeed, subjunctive manner: “I don’t know what the 
proof is, but if we presume for a minute that the proof 
is…” Even a cynical stance, which assumes that Fein-
stein and others are lying and there is no proof at all, 
requires some presumptive position to be taken 
against the knowledge that another has “for” me.  
Certainly, the subject is not always forced to pre-
tend to some knowledge of surveillance, interpassive 
or not. Nina Eliasoph’s ethnography of Americans’ eve-
ryday discussion of politics describes communities 
which consistently shy away from talking politics. 
When Eliasoph herself brought such topics up, it was 
seen as “an inert, distant, impersonal realm” too hard 
to get a handle on. It was a shame that political prob-
lems happened, and the “public” should do something 
about it—but that “public”, the people who ostensibly 
knew enough to debate the problem, were not them 
(Eliasoph, 1998, pp. 131-135). Even the refusal to have 
an opinion was qualified by the interpellation of an 
other who participates in publics in my stead. The re-
course to interpassivity is not reducible to voluntary 
“choice” by an autonomous agent. It is a responsivity 
demanded by a situation—a situation which comprises 
of the recession of surveillance, including the logic of 
secrecy and security folded into the debate.  
Not only can the other know for me, but they can 
also do and experience for me. Since surveillance’s per-
vasiveness far outstrips the highly infrequent occasions 
on which it intrudes tangibly into individual lives, inter-
passivity becomes a key technique by which a given po-
litical and affective orientation becomes fleshed out in-
to our reality: 
My older, conservative neighbour quickly insisted 
that collecting this metadata thing she had heard 
about on Fox was necessary to protect her from all 
the terrorists out here in suburbia. She then vehe-
mently disagreed that it was okay for President 
Obama to know whom she called and when, from 
where to where and for how long, or for him to 
know who those people called and when, and so 
forth. (Van Buren, 2013) 
One might read this as typical liberal snarkiness about 
the cognitive dissonance of a stubborn conservative. 
But the general sentiment that there are people out 
there, “bad things” happening out there, that need to 
be watched and stopped is far from an abnormal one. 
Hence my own feeling of safety, my own ability to im-
agine a safer world, arises from a situation where 
someone else is surveilling someone else—myself, not 
being “that kind of person”, one degree removed from 
the whole unpleasant affair. Indeed, interpassivity does 
not stop at projecting “probable factual events”; it also 
leverages downright fictional others. The non-news, fic-
tional media thus participate in the ritualistic function: 
Great Britain’s George Orwell warned us of the 
danger of this kind of information. The types of col-
lection in the book—microphones and video cam-
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eras, TVs that watch us—are nothing compared to 
what we have available today. We have sensors in 
our pockets that track us everywhere we go. (Ed-
ward Snowden in “Whistleblower Edward Snowden 
gives,”2013) 
Snowden’s comparison might have been a little redun-
dant. Sales of Orwell’s 1984 had already rocketed by 
some 6,000% after his initial leaks in June (Hendrix, 
2013). Of course, one cannot claim that the public 
flocked to Orwell, Dick and Huxley in order to take 
them literally as prophecy. But such fictional work 
clearly served as resources for making sense of the 
confused present and the uncertain future. Some of 
this imaginative media also intersected the contempo-
rary surveillance debate with an older tradition of rep-
resenting crime and police work. Jonathan Nolan’s Per-
son of Interest debuted in U.S. television in 2011, two 
years before the Snowden leaks. The series was never-
theless conceived through extensive consultation of 
U.S. state surveillance practices as was known and es-
timated at the time (Gan, 2013). The popular series 
presented the public with an NSA-style dragnet which 
“spies on you every hour of every day”, which the pro-
tagonist would use each episode to track down indi-
viduals before they became perpetrators or victims of 
violent crime. On one hand, “The Machine”, Person of 
Interest’s mass surveillance program, is clearly based 
on and evocative of U.S. state surveillance, providing 
the public with a simulation of hypotheticals. On the 
other hand, its show structure necessarily produces a 
world where urban crime of every kind proliferates and 
may strike any individual without notice. George Gerb-
ner’s famous cultivation theory suggested that media 
can have long-term, sedimented effects—that it can 
train people into presuming phenomena that lie beyond 
their own lives in order to, say, develop a heightened 
fear of criminal victimisation. This is not to say that Per-
son of Interest is alarmist. The point is that insofar as ter-
ror and crime are not everyday realities for many (not 
all) of the population, we turn to fictional as well as 
strictly journalistic representations to develop an idea of 
what we can only assume is happening “out there”. No-
body believes a television show is objectively true. But 
we often do leverage it for our world-building—just as 
we leverage the presumed opinions and actions of “oth-
ers”, and just as we leverage facts and statements we do 
not fully believe and cannot quite confirm. 
6. Feeling-Knowing 
Contemporary online surveillance is one which recedes 
in multiple ways from lived experience. This recession 
accentuates surveillance society’s quality as a world 
out there: a vast, virtual entity which constantly eludes 
our knowing and living. Yet it is something which we 
invest a great deal of belief and passion into, cobbling 
what we know and suspect into a picture of a sensible, 
working world. The mediated public discourse on the 
Snowden affair exhibits two major techniques of such 
world-building. First, it leverages the virtuality and un-
knowability of surveillance as if it were in some way 
true and certain, producing hypothetical, provisionary 
bases for real, enduring actions and beliefs. Second, it 
encourages the notion that if not me, then another will 
know, experience, do in my stead. Even if the world of 
surveillance and terror is not real in my back yard, 
these interpellated others will make it real enough for 
me. The idea of the “public” or “society” provides a 
vast landscape of deferrals and potentials, a protective 
ambiguity for my political beliefs.  
We began with a rhetorical question: “we knew al-
ready”, didn’t we? Well, what has knowing ever done 
for us, anyway? What matters at least as much as what 
we know or not, is what kind of knowing and believing 
has allowed us to engage that information. It is about 
what, affectively and epistemologically, it means to say 
‘I know’. Much has been made of the secrecy that sur-
rounds state surveillance—the arcana imperii—and 
even corporate data-mining operations. The debate 
over Snowden as hero or traitor also revolves around 
this opposition of secrecy and transparency. Scholarly 
commentary often laments the ambiguous, uncertain 
and impoverished kinds of information the public is of-
fered about surveillance. All of this is undoubtedly sig-
nificant. But what this essay suggests is that we must 
also understand what techniques, what habits, of 
knowing and believing proliferate and become legiti-
mated in this political environment. What wirings of 
narrative arcs, tropes, stereotypes, emotive associa-
tions, come into play in the discourse, images and prac-
tices of the surveillance society? It cannot simply be 
unrestrained paranoia or dangerousness. We use these 
symbolic ingredients not only to become afraid or sus-
picious, but also to cope with our subjection to surveil-
lance, to make our daily routines and affects still make 
sense in this new world order. This line of questioning 
asks not what we know, but how we come to feel we 
know. And ultimately, it asks whether, given different 
circumstances, we could have a different relationship 
to knowing and believing surveillance.  
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